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This study aims to analyze the effect of political and economic factors on the adoption of 
environmental policies. I focus on the municipal waste recycling policies, particularly on the 
implementation of the Door-to-Door collection model, which leads to high recycling rates of 
municipal waste. I build a panel data comprising the period 2000-2019, at the Catalan municipal 
level. This analysis is based on the hypothesis that women in local politics are more likely to 
implement stricter environmental policies than their male counterparts, as the adoption of the 
Door-to-Door collection model. In addition, I analyze the influence of the “green” political parties, 
as another political factor. Furthermore, I examine whether economic motives, such as the landfill 
tax, is behind the adoption of this waste collection model.  I do not find empirical evidence of any 
political factor influencing the adoption of the Door-to-Door model. Contrary, I do find a positive 
effect of the landfill tax on the implementation of the Door-to-Door collection model.  
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                                                                “We are either going to have a future where women lead the way to make 
peace with the Earth or we are not going to have a human future at all.” 




Climate change has become one of the most important challenges in the world nowadays. The 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere showed new records in 2019, and the level of CO2 was 18% higher 
from 2015 to 2019 than in the previous five years (UN, 2021a). The rise of the average global temperature 
has increased by 0.85°C from 1880 to 2012. Today the Earth is 1.2°C warmer than in the late 1800s (UN, 
2021b). The average sea level increased by 19 cm, and oceans expanded, due to warming and ice melted, 
between 1901 and 2010 (IPCC, 2013). Moreover, given the current path on emissions of greenhouse gases, 
it is likely the rise in global temperature would exceed 1.5°C by the end of the century (IPCC, 2018). In this 
respect, political international agreements come into play to take action against the climate emergency. On 
one hand, the Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015 by 196 parties, has the ambitious goal to limit global 
warming below 2°C this century, optimally to 1.5°C, by adopting several coordinated policies (UN, 2015a). 
On the other hand, in 2015 the United Nations General Assembly approved “The 2030 Agenda”. In this, 
are ratified 17 Global Goals and associated targets, which lead together the new sustainable path intended 
to be achieved by 2030. Climate action and sustainable consumption patterns are two of the 17 Global 
Goals (UN, 2015b). Notice, these multilateral agreements help us to understand the importance of the 
current climate emergency and the need to take coordinated actions among countries. In this sense, politics 
at all levels are becoming pivotal to implement stricter environmental policies.  
Within the global climate action, policies on waste management are considered. These policies focus 
on targets of reduction, reuse, and recycling of waste. Especially, they focus on municipal waste management 
aiming for high recycling rates (UN, 2015a; UN, 2015b; EC, 2015; EEA, 2018). The management of waste 
is understood as a strategic sector in terms of saving global emissions. It is estimated that solid waste 
management implies around 3% of the global greenhouse gas emissions in 2010, mainly due to landfill sites 
(UNEP, 2015). However, waste management can potentially contribute to the reduction of global 
greenhouse emissions across sectors of the economy, calculated as up to 10-15%.1 Then, it has the capability 
to mitigate climate change in the short term and reduce emissions across the economy; mainly by reducing 
landfill disposal, recycling waste, and reducing waste generation (UNEP, 2015). In short, the potential 
contribution of waste management and recycled waste would lead to a net reduction of global greenhouse 
emissions across the economy. In this direction, it is globally aimed to follow a more sustainable path in the 
use of resources; aiming for selective waste collection, reduction of waste generation, and high recycling 
rates of municipal waste. Thereby, being this the core of this study.  
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In the European context, there is also a vast regulation framework to take action against the 
environmental emergency. Hence, contributing to the commitment of the international agreements and 
their goals. The European “Plan for the Circular Economy” (EC, 2015) puts the focus on the management 
of waste and the circular economy.2 Within this context, the more recent European regulation has built the 
recycling rate indicator through which was set a target of 50% of municipal waste to be recycled in 2020 in 
all EU Member States; 55% by 2025, 60% by 2030, and 65% by 2035 (EEA, 2018). In sum, achieving higher 
recycling rates of municipal waste has become a key objective among environmental policies. The recycled 
and reused municipal waste should play a key role from now on in the political landscape, directly influencing 
the lowest level of politics. Thus, it is relevant to analyze its economic and political determinants; what 
policies are the most effective to meet the recycling rate’s targets, and what determines their implementation. 
In this master thesis, I aim to analyze the political and economic factors that lead to implementing stringent 
environmental policies related to waste recycling. 
 
The analysis is implemented at the Catalan municipal level. Catalonia is a region of Spain that has the 
political responsibility to meet the aforementioned international recycling targets (UN, 2015b; EEA, 2018). 
In this line, Catalonia was the first region of Spain to introduce a landfill tax in 2004. This fact is very 
determinant for my study, which puts this region very ahead in the recycling policies of municipal waste 
within Spain. Moreover, in Catalonia, there is the Agència de Residus de Catalunya (ARC), a public entity with 
competence over waste management within its territory. It incentivizes selective waste collection across 
municipalities, providing public data and studies related to waste management. Then, Catalonia is the only 
region of Spain in providing highly detailed data, at the municipal level. This data is available from the year 
2000 until today, allowing both time-series and cross-section analysis. Given this suitable setting, the data 
from the 947 Catalan municipalities’ allows me to construct a rich dataset and to conduct my analysis.  
This study empirically tests political and economic factors that determine the local policies implemented 
to improve the waste recycling rate. I focus on the selective waste collection of municipal waste, specifically, 
on the adoption of the Door-to-Door collection model. This model is found as the most effective in 
achieving higher recycling rates, hence, avoiding or reducing landfill disposal. Therefore, the adoption of 
the Door-to-Door model becomes the determinant policy of this analysis. Regarding the political scenario, 
I study whether female representation in local politics leads to adopting the Door-to-Door collection model. 
I also analyze another political factor, as the influence of the “green” political parties.3 Finally, I examine if 
municipalities respond to economic motives such as the tax on landfill disposal.  
To conduct the empirical analysis I first implement a Propensity Score Matching (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1985; Caliendo and Kopeining, 2005; Ho et al., 2007) to select the sample of municipalities to be 
                                                          
2 The circular economy has the goal to use the resources for as long as possible. By recycling and reusing materials, products and/or waste it 
attempts to extract the maximum value of them, and to reduce the waste generation. The circular economy aims for a circular use of materials (EC, 
2015). 
3 “Green” political parties are identified as those local political parties with a clear commitment with environmental policies within their 




used in the analysis. In the end, I obtained a matched sample with nearly identical municipalities. After 
matching, I proceed with the empirical analysis by using a municipality Fixed Effects model, from which I 
am able to estimate the causal effects of political and economic factors on the Door-to-Door model. I do 
not find empirical evidence that female representation nor “green” parties influence the adoption of the 
Door-to-Door model. Contrary, I do find empirical evidence that the landfill tax positively impacts the 
implementation of the Door-to-Door model. Consequently, the landfill tax is the only instrument that 
incentivizes stricter municipal waste policies, rather than political factors. 
 
The findings of this study contribute to the literature primarily in two ways. Firstly, this is the first study 
that focuses on the municipal level of Catalonia, aiming to analyze the potential effect of female politicians 
on political outcomes. Within a Spanish context, recent literature has focused on the gender of politicians, 
mainly studying the effect of gender quotas, introduced in Spain in 2007 and 2011, (Casas-Arce and Saiz, 
2015; Bagues and Campa, 2018; Bagues and Campa, 2020). In this study, I do not focus on the gender 
quotes but the role of female politicians in the municipal councils and their effect on the environmental 
policies of waste management. Hence, I study the role of women in politics from a different perspective 
than the studies above. Secondly, this master thesis set as a central point the municipal waste management. 
It considers the current global fight against climate change focusing on the local political actions (Sundström 
and McCright, 2014; Frederiksson and Wang, 2011). At the same time, this is linked with the international 
political lines from the climate agreements (UN, 2015a; UN, 2015b; EC, 2015; EEA, 2018). Then, this is 
the first study that analyzes the political factors behind the adopted municipal environmental policies, given 
the current climate emergency and the suitable Catalan setting.  
The rest of this master thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 shows the literature review and the 
contribution of this study. Section 3 exposes the institutional and political setting. Section 4 describes the 
main features of municipal waste management in Catalonia. Section 5 introduces the database and the 
summary statistics. Section 6 details the empirical strategy. Section 7 presents the results and the validation 
of the empirical strategy. Finally, section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Literature review  
 
This master thesis is based on two main assumptions from economic literature. The first hypothesis 
assumes that the gender of politicians may influence the final political outcome. The under-representation 
of women in politics is a common feature shared by all democracies around the globe.4 Hence, a growing 
economic literature has studied the rise of female representation and their leadership in politics. Under the 
assumption in which the identity of the politician matters for policy decisions (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; 
Besley and Coate, 1997), the role of female representation may influence the political outcome. Then, 
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putting the focus on gender, it is found that female politicians are expected to implement more policies that 
are relevant for women's needs; regarding social care, education-children, basic public good-needs 
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011), or higher spending on health policies (Bhalotra and 
Clots-Figueras, 2014).  
Following this line, and given the huge gender gap in political representation, gender parity has become 
a desired worldwide target to be achieved.5 In recent years a large number of countries have implemented 
various types of electoral gender quotas, fighting the unbalanced representation between genders in political 
life (International IDEA, 2021). Consequently, economic literature has also focused on the study of the 
introduction of gender quotas in politics. The rise in quality among politicians is a result derived from the 
introduction of gender quotas (Baltrunaite et al., 2014; Besley et al., 2017). Also the increase of female 
leaders (O’Brien and Rickne, 2016) or the change of voters’ behavior (Beaman et. al. 2009; De Paola et al., 
2010; Beaman et. al., 2012). Additionally, Baskaran and Hessami, (2018) report, using data from Germany, 
the effect of raising the share of female council members when a female mayor has been previously elected.   
Considering the above, the second main assumption of this study is that women politicians are more 
likely to implement stringent environmental policies than their male counterparts. Previous literature has 
reported differences in attitudes towards the environment, suggesting that females are more concerned than 
males about climate change (McCright, 2010; McCright and Dunlap, 2011). There are also stated gender 
differences in the mitigation strategies against environmental issues and climate change (EIGE, 2016). In 
this sense, it has introduced the gender dimension when making environmental policies at a European and 
more international level (EIGE, 2013; EIGE, 2016). Furthermore, literature also studied the role of female 
politicians in the adoption of environmental policies. Women show more environmental concern in the 
lowest level of politics but do not find evidence in the Swedish national parliament (Sundström and 
McCright, 2014).  In the US House of Representative's context, it is found that women legislators support 
stricter environment policies than men legislators (Frederiksson and Wang, 2011). More recently, 
Mavisakalyan and Tarverdi (2019) find that female representation entails the national parliaments to approve 
stricter environmental policies regarding climate change than men, considering a vast sample of 
countries. Additionally, Ramstetter and Habersack (2020) analyze the gender differences towards 
environmental policies among Members of the European Parliament. Female legislators are more likely to 
support pro-environment policies than their male counterparts.  
This master thesis focuses on municipal environmental policies regarding waste recycling (Romano et 
al., 2019; Soukiazis and Proença, 2020). In my case, the selective waste collection and the implementation 
of the Door-to-Door model are the subjects of the study. Hence, female presence in Catalan municipal 
councils might drive stringent environmental policies than their male counterparts, by adopting the Door-
to-Door collection model. Additionally, I also analyze another political factor, such as the representation of 
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“green” political parties. Finally, I study whether the economic effect of the landfill tax leads to adopting 
stringent environmental policies. So, the municipalities would respond to economic motives, given the 
design of this tax and the direct influence on the municipal budgets. The landfill tax discourages landfill 
disposal and so, promotes the implementation of selective waste collection (ENT, 2012; OFR, 2019).    
 
3 Institutional background: Spain and Catalonia 
 
This section describes the political and institutional context of Spain and Catalonia, including the 
municipal electoral system, the introduction of legislated gender quotas, and the jurisdiction of the municipal 
councils, being the waste management a municipal competence. Also, it exposes the situation of female 
representation in local politics, the social attitudes on environmental issues, and describes the “green” 
parties’ identification.  
 
I) Spain 
Basic institutional setting. In Spain, the Spanish Constitution6, from 1978, shapes the current institutional 
and political organization of the country. The Prime Minister is the head of the executive power and the 
President of the Government. Then, the central government has all powers ultimately vaster. However, 
some competencies are transferred to lower levels of government in the country. The institutional 
organization of Spain in its territorial dimension includes seventeen Autonomous Communities and two 
Autonomous Cities, with their respective governments and autonomy. Therefore, there are three layers of 
government in the country: the central government, the regional governments, and the municipal 
governments. 
 
Municipal electoral system. The municipal governments are the lowest level of administration and 
political decisions in Spain. Every four years municipal elections are held and the municipal council members 
are directly elected by their voters. The municipal electoral system, regulated by Ley Orgánica 5/1985, differs 
depending on the population. Municipalities with less than 250 inhabitants follow an open-list system, and 
municipalities with more than 250 inhabitants follow a closed-list and proportional electoral system.  As 
well, the distribution of the number of seats in municipal councils (from municipalities with 7 seats to a 
maximum of 41 in Barcelona, in the case of Catalonia) depends on the population. Moreover, the municipal 
electoral system also considers the so-called “D’Hondt Rule”, which determines the allocation of seats from 
the votes obtained. Also, it requires a 5% of vote share for entry into the municipal council7. In the end, 
following the majority rule, the mayor is elected by the municipal council. Hence, the municipal 
governments are constituted by the same municipal council, and the mayor is the political leader. 
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Municipal jurisdiction: municipal waste management. In Spain, there is a distribution of competencies 
on waste management among the central government, the regional governments, and the local governments. 
This division of responsibilities through the three political levels is regulated by Ley 10/1998.8 In this sense, 
the Spanish central Government has competencies in the development of national waste plans. The 
Autonomous Communities (or regional governments) have competencies in the preparation of the regional 
waste plans. They are also responsible for the authorization, control, inspection, and penalty of waste 
generation and waste management activities. Finally, the local governments have competencies in the 
management of urban/municipal waste, and are also under regional regulation. Therefore, municipalities 
are responsible for the collection, transportation, and at least, the elimination of municipal waste, as an 
essential service.  
Following the definition form (OECD, 2021), municipal waste is the waste that is collected and treated 
by or for municipalities. It does not include waste from municipal sewage networks and treatment, nor waste 
from demolition and construction activities. In Spain, the Decreto Legislativo 1/2009 defines municipal waste 
as the waste generated in private homes, shops, offices, and services. Also, all waste that is not considered 
hazardous, and the one from cleaning public roads, green areas, recreational areas, and beaches; dead 
domestic animals; furniture, utensils, and abandoned vehicles; waste and rubble from minor building works 
and household repairs.9    
 
Introduction of legislated gender quotas. The use of legislated gender quotes is increasing worldwide. 
These are designed to increase female participation in political life (International IDEA, 2021). By using 
numerical targets, gender quotas aim to ensure women constitute at least a significant share of the total 
seats10. In Spain co-exist two kinds of gender quotas; the legislated quotas under the Spanish Equality Law, 
Ley Orgánica 3/2007, and the voluntary quotas adopted by some political parties. Note in this study, I focus 
on the legislated gender quotas. In Spain, in March 2007 the Equality Law11 was approved modifying the 
current Spanish electoral law. Since 2007, all party electoral lists are required to have a minimum of 40% 
and a maximum of 60% of either sex among their candidates list every five positions. In 2007, this rule was 
applied to municipalities with more than 5000 inhabitants. By 2011, this Equality Law was extended and 
just municipalities with less than 3000 will not be obligated to follow the equality rule. As stated, the quotas 
are not only applied to the whole party list but also every 5 posts. If the number of eligible posts is less than 
5, then the list must be as close as possible to the 40-60% equilibrium between genders (International IDEA, 
2021). 
 
                                                          
8 See details Ley 10/1998 [online] Available at: https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1998-9478  
9
 Definition included in Decreto Legislativo 1/2009 [online] Available at: https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2009-17181  
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 The objective of the quota system is to ensure that women constitute a large minority of 20, 30, or 40% of the political seats. Also exists 
the 50% quota, ensuring the true gender balance. The average share of female representation in countries with implemented quotas is 26.8% 
(International IDEA, 2021). 
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Female participation in Spanish politics. In the same direction as the vast European countries, women 
in Spain are under-represented in all political levels: in the Spanish national Parliament, the share of seats 
held by women has risen considerably in the last two decades. In 2000, 28% of seats in the national 
parliament were held by women (Fernández, Fernández and de Ulzurrun, 2003). This number rises to 44% 
by 2020 (EIGE, 2021). Currently, Spain has one of the most gender-balanced parliaments in the European 
Union, being this 44% noticeably higher than the European average, 32.3%.12 Nevertheless, no woman has 
ever been Prime Minister in Spain, yet.  
At the local level, the situation follows the same direction as the national parliament. In the last two 
decades, female representation has also increased. In 2000, 21% of seats were held by women. By 2020, it 
was 40.8% (EIGE, 2021). This last share is larger than the European average, 34.1%,13 but still far from full 
parity. Regarding the gender of the mayor in municipal councils, the over-representation of men is more 
remarkable. In 2000, 9.6% of the mayors in Spain were women. Only 21.7% were female mayors by 2020 
(EIGE, 2021). Hence, illustrating the huge underrepresentation of female leaders in Spanish politics.   
 
Social attitudes on climate change and recycling domestic waste. In Spain, differences among genders 
are reported when looking at social attitudes on environmental issues. It is stated 78.5% of women consider 
the environment as a major concern, and 75.2% of men. Moreover, 10.2% of women declared to suffer 
problems due to pollution and other environmental issues, the 9.6% for men (INE, 2008; INE, 2019).  
As particularly concerns the municipal waste, (Ipsos, 2019) provides a social barometer reflecting 
Spaniard’s opinion on the environment and recycling the domestic waste in 2019. This shows a higher 
tendency of women in recycling domestic waste than men.14 When asking about the importance of recycling 
domestic waste as a positive impact on the environment; 96% of women and 92% of men agree. Regarding 
the change of behavior, in consumption and generation of domestic waste, it is reported that women are 
the most conscious aiming to reduce the environmental impact than men.15 Overall, this social barometer 
reflects women are more likely to take action against climate change in Spain. Moreover, women seem to 
be the key player in most domestic actions such as recycling municipal waste.  
 
II)  Catalonia 
Basic institutional setting. Catalonia is one of the seventeen Autonomous Communities of Spain. The 
Catalan Government exercises its self-government following the Spanish Constitution and with the new 
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 Members of parliament or assembly: 32.3% of female seats in 2020 (Q1), EU-28 average (EIGE, 2021). 
13 Members of the municipal council (or equivalent): 34.1% of female seats, in 2020, EU-28 average (EIGE, 2021). 
14 Recycling domestic waste according to sex: Women: plastics; 83%, glass; 83%, paper, 83%, organic waste, 63%. Men: plastics; 81%, glass; 
80%, paper; 79%, organic waste; 61% (Ipsos, 2019). 
15
 91% of women prefer products with less plastic packaging, and 73% of women don’t use plastic bags when grocery shopping. For men, 




Catalan Statute of Autonomy16, approved in 2006. In Catalonia, there are 947 municipalities in 2019, which 
their municipal governments constitute the lowest stage of political decision. Catalan municipalities are 
under the same municipal electoral system that Spain, regulated by Ley Orgánica 5/1985. Hence, Catalonia is 
also subject to the Spanish Equality Law, Ley Orgánica 3/2007, and to the introduction of legislative gender 
quotas in 2007 and 2011 (see above).  
 
Municipal jurisdiction: municipal waste management. As exposed above, the distribution of 
competencies on waste management among the three levels of governments is regulated by the Spanish law, 
Ley 10/1998. Therefore, Catalan municipalities have competencies in the management of urban/municipal 
waste, and also under the Catalan regulation. They are responsible for the collection, transportation, and 
elimination of municipal waste. Hence, it includes selective waste collection and municipal recycling policies. 
The current climate emergency has put the focus on environmental policies, also at the local level of 
politics. The management of municipal waste has become a central point, being the local politicians who 
must take action on it.  
 
The Agència de Residus de Catalunya, hereafter ARC, is a Catalan public entity responsible for 
disseminating the environmental policy targets of the Catalan government and local governments. Hence, 
this public agency has jurisdiction over the waste generated and managed in Catalonia (ARC, 2021). The 
main goals of the ARC are the protection of the environment and the improvement of the quality of life of 
citizens. As its specific objectives, the promotion of selective waste collection and the minimization of waste 
generation are the main ones (ARC, 2021). Note the Catalan policy targets are in the same line as the 
international objectives subject to (UN, 2015a; UN, 2015b; EC, 2015; EEA, 2018).   
The ARC plays a fundamental role in this study. Firstly, it shows Catalonia very ahead in terms of 
awareness of environmental impacts from waste management and in recycling policies. In this regard, since 
2005, every year several campaigns have been conducted by this public entity. The main goal of these 
campaigns is to reach the Catalan society on specific topics; such as the proper selection of municipal waste, 
the importance of recycling and reducing waste, or the reuse of resources (ARC, 2021). Moreover, Catalonia 
is the first region of Spain to introduce a landfill tax in 2004 (see details in section 4). This economic 
instrument aims to incentivize selective waste collection models, rather than landfill disposal. In the design 
of this instrument, the ARC plays a determinant role (ARC, 2021).  
Besides, Catalonia is the only region of Spain in providing highly detailed data, at the municipal level; 
on waste generation, on recycling rates of municipal waste, and selective collection waste. This data is 
publicly shared by the ARC, together with the Catalan Government. It shows updated data allowing for a 
European comparison on specific targets; such as the recycling rate of municipal waste.  
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Female participation in Catalan politics.  In Catalonia, the under-representation of female seats in 
regional and local politics is in the same line as in Spain. In 2000 the share of female seats in the Catalan 
parliament was 25%. By 2020 this share was 43.7% (Direcció d’Estudis Parlamentaris, 2021). This last 
percentage is also higher than the European average in 2020, 32.3%, and almost identical to the Spanish 
national parliament, 44% (EIGE, 2021).  
At the Catalan municipal level, the situation is also very similar. In the last two decades, female 
participation has risen considerably. In 2000 the share of female seats in municipal councils was 18.3%. By 
2020 this was 42% (ICPS, 2020). However, when looking at the gender of mayors the under-representation 
of women is even more sizable. In 2000, the share of female mayors was only 6.8%. In 2020, 23% of Catalan 
mayors were females (ICPS, 2020), showing a considerably unbalanced situation between genders in political 
leadership. Figure 1 shows the evolution of female representation in municipal politics in Catalonia. It 
includes the period considered in the analysis, from 2000 to 2019. 
 




Notes: % Female (Male) Seats: share of seats held by women (men) in Catalan municipal councils, once they are constituted after the election. % Female (Male) Mayors: 
share of municipalities that have a female (male) mayor, once municipal councils are constituted. The variables include the totality of Catalan municipalities. There are five 
municipal election periods (1999-2003, 2003-2007, 2007-2011, 2011-2015, and 2015-2019).   
Source: Own elaboration based on data from (ICSP, 2020).                                      
 
 
From Figure 1 it is observed the share of female seats, at the local level, has continually increased in 
the twenty years considered. However, being still far from the full gender parity, particularly considering 
female leaders. In other words, it is shown an over-representation of men across Catalan municipal councils. 
This study aims to test whether the female presence in local politics influences the adoption of stringent 
environmental policies on municipal waste management, such as the implementation of the Door-to-Door 
collection model. Then, the representation of women in local politics provides key variables for the analysis. 
 
Identification of “green” political parties. This master thesis also aims to study the influence of “green” 
parties on the adoption of environmental policies regarding municipal waste recycling. I identify as “green” 
parties those local parties that are politically committed to the protection and preservation of the 
environment, according to their founding statutes and ideology. I base this identification on the “Diccionari 
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all political parties that were created in Catalonia during the 20th century. Additionally, given the last fifteen 
years, the political scene in Catalonia has changed considerably, and new parties have been founded and not 
reported by (ICSP, 2000). Thus, for the identification of the newest parties I used their own political 
statutes17.  
The identification is done for parties that have representation at the local political scope of Catalonia 
between 2000 and 2019. I build a binary dummy variable which equals one when the political party is 
identified as a “green” party, and equals zero otherwise.  This builds another set of key variables of this 
study.  
 
4 Management of municipal waste 
 
This section describes the selective waste collection in Catalonia and its specific models, being the 
Door-to-Door model one of them. It also presents the recycling rate indicator and describes the European 
recycling objectives. Finally, it exposes the landfill tax and its central role in municipal waste management 
in Catalonia.  
 
Recycling Rate of municipal waste. This indicator measures the share of recycled municipal waste in the 
total municipal waste generation (Eurostat, 2021). The goals of recycling policies are to augment the 
recycling rate, extract more value from the resources used, and reduce the environmental impact associated 
with waste management. Thus, there are two ways to increase this rate; by increasing the recycled municipal 
waste and by reducing the municipal waste generation. This indicator is built in the context of European 
environmental regulation. Regarding municipal waste management, two European plans were created within 
the last decade: the “7th Environment Action Program” (EC, 2014) and the aforementioned “Plan for the 
Circular Economy” (EC, 2015). Both established general objectives and specific targets to be met by each 
EU Member State. Among them, the targets on recycling rate of municipal waste were stated: 50% of 
recycling rate by 2020; 55% by 2025; 60% by 2030; and 65% by 2035 (EEA, 2018). Considering this setting, 
I build Figure 2, from which I show the evolution of municipal waste recycling in a European comparative.  
Therefore, Figure 2 illustrates the recycling rates in 2000, 2010, and 2019 for the European countries 
and Catalonia. I observe an increase, over time, in the recycling rate of municipal waste across countries. 
However, notice that less than half of the countries from the illustration have reached the 50% target in 
2019, one year before the target was scheduled. On the other hand, the evolution of Catalonia in terms of 
the recycling rate is; 10.5% in 2000, 35.6% in 2010, and 49.5% in 2019. These are higher rates than Spain in 
the last decade and are very close to the objective of 50%. In addition, 405 out of 947 Catalan municipalities 
have already achieved this target by 2019 (ARC, 2021). Overall, Catalonia demonstrates good performance 
in terms of recycling municipal waste as a region, in the European context. 
                                                          
17 Amongst the main Catalan parties: Ciutadans, Catalunya en Comú-Podem (before, Catalunya sí que es pot) and Junts per Catalunya have been 




Figure 2: Recycling rate of municipal waste (%). European countries and Catalonia. Period 2000-2019 
 
Note: In green, it includes the data for Catalonia. The red line indicates the European target of 50% of the recycling rate, to be met in 2020. The data missing in the 
figure is due to “data not available” in the given year by (Eurostat, 2021).  
Source: Own elaboration based on data from “Recycling rate of municipal waste (%)” (Eurostat, 2021) and data from (ACR, 2021).                                      
 
 
Selective waste collection. As introduced in section 1, the management of municipal waste and its impact 
on the environment makes this sector very strategic. Selective waste collection refers to the classification of 
municipal waste in various types: organic waste, glass, plastic/containers, and paper/cardboard. And also 
the rest fraction, which is the waste from the domestic and commercial use that cannot be selected for either 
of the fractions above. The main objective of selective waste collection is to recycle the maximum of the 
generated waste (ARC, 2021). In Catalonia, municipal selective waste collection is mandatory, following the 
Catalan law18. In this sense, I build Figure 3, which summarizes the four main modalities of selective waste 
collection used in Catalonia and their main characteristics. Each model has its own advantages and 
drawbacks, in terms of costs of installation, impact on public streets, or effectiveness on recycling targets, 
among others (ARC, 2021). Therefore, a comparison between them is rather complex. Note the modality 
of Surface Containers is the most widely used in Catalonia, followed by the Door-to-Door model.  
The decision on the implementation of the model is made by each municipal council. It responds to 
the urban characteristics of each municipality (ARC, 2021), but it is also likely to depend on the demographic 
characteristics of each municipality, like population or density of population (Puig-Ventosa et al., 2013; 
Romano et al., 2019; ARC, 2021). Moreover, political factors could also play a role in the decision, as this 
study aims to analyze. Additionally, economic incentives are likely to influence (ENT, 2013). Overall, given 
the European objectives on recycling municipal waste, selective waste collection has become essential. In 
this line, some studies focus on one specific model, the Door-to-Door collection model. This is reported as 
the best in achieving the highest recycling rates, in Catalonia (ENT, 2012; APAP, 2021). And this is the 
policy core of my study.  
 
 
                                                          
















Figure 3:  Summary of modalities of selective waste collection in Catalonia 




Yes. On the streets or in drop-off areas.  
 
 
The containers are emptied periodically. 
Buried Containers Yes. Installed below the ground level. 
 
Drop boxes and elevation system. 
Door-to-Door No. Each household leaves the waste outside of its front door, 
on accorded days and hours. The municipal collectors 
collect the municipal waste from the streets, door to door, 
following the accorded schedule.  
Pneumatic No.  
 
Drop boxes connected to an underground suction point. 
Source: Own elaboration based on information from (ARC, 2021) 
 
 
Door-to-Door collection model.  Among the four main models of selective waste collection, this study 
focuses on the Door-to-Door model, hereafter DtD model. This requires, previously sorted out in origin, 
to let the waste in front of the households’ door to collect by municipal service. There are predefined days 
and hours for each type of waste to be collected. It is stated that this model works when, at least, organic 
and rest waste are collected. Nevertheless, it also allows for the other fractions of waste; as paper-cardboard, 
plastic packages, and/or glass (APAP, 2021).  
Probably the most particular feature of this model, and also the biggest challenge, is the implicit change 
of habits for the citizens which are subject to. At present, the DtD collection model is not the most applied 
across municipalities in Catalonia. However, the number of municipalities that have adopted the DtD model 
is continuously increasing over time. In 2000, only 3 municipalities had implemented the DtD model. By 
2019, 212 municipalities had the DtD model19. Moreover, the DtD model can be implemented totally or 
partially, depending on the population which is subject to the model. This fact allows for a gradual 
implementation of the model into the municipality. It is stated this is the only collection model able to reach 
high recycling rates; it reduces waste generation, and at the same time, increases the recycled municipal waste 
(ENT, 2012; APAP, 2021). The adoption of this model is the determinant policy in my analysis, being the 
most effective in terms of positive impacts on the environment, regarding recycling waste. 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that in Catalonia, the Associació de municipis catalans per a la recollida 
Porta a Porta (APAP) plays an important role while encouraging municipalities to implement this specific 
model. At the same time, it publishes reports and evaluations of the implementation of the DtD model, in 
terms of its effectiveness or costs (ENT, 2012; ENT, 2013; APAP, 2021). Moreover, it provides public data, 
such as this study is based on.  
 
Landfill Tax.  Catalonia introduced in 2004 a tax waste, called landfill tax, for the disposal of non-hazardous 
municipal waste in legal landfills (ARC, 2021). This economic instrument was introduced by the Catalan 
government with two specific intentions; 1) to penalize the landfill disposal and 2) to reward the amount of 
selective waste collection and the quality of recycled waste. Then, this tax aims to incentivize selective waste 
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collection and so, to increase the recycling rates (ARC, 2017). In other words, as more selective waste 
collection and better the quality of this, the less the municipal council has to pay in the end as a tax (it will 
receive a higher reward). The landfill tax, given its design, is expected to have a notorious impact on the 
management of municipal waste through municipal budgets. Hence, the evolution of the Catalan landfill tax 
is also important to analyze since the last decade has risen noticeably, directly affecting the municipal 
budgets. In 2004 the landfill tax was 10€/t, by 2019 it was 41.3€/t, and it is expected to keep increasing to 
71.6€/t by 2024 (ARC, 2021).  
Catalonia was a pioneer region in Spain when it introduced the landfill tax in 2004. Until 2012 any other 
region of Spain had introduced any tax on landfill disposal, in 2012 Castilla y León implemented a landfill 
tax (Watkins et al., 2012). Nowadays, in Spain, there are still some regions that do not have any tax on 
landfill disposal.20 Contrary, in the European context the first landfill tax was introduced in 1987 in Denmark 
and followed by several countries over the years (Watkins et al., 2012). In 2020, in the EU-27, 23 member 
states have a landfill tax (CWEWR, 2020). In this direction, the European environmental regulation beyond 
2020 includes; from 2030, a ban on landfilling of waste suitable for recycling, and a target to reduce landfill 




This section describes the data sources of the variables of the analysis. It also presents a summary of 
statistics and a description of the variables of interest. I constructed panel data of 947 Catalan municipalities, 
for the period 2000-2019.  
 
I) Data sources 
 
Municipal Waste Database. I obtained data on municipal waste from the open database of the Agència de 
Residus de Catalunya (ARC, 2021), which collects highly detailed information at the municipal level of 
Catalonia. It includes the recycling rate of municipal waste and it also provides data on the landfill tax. 
Regarding the implementation of the Door-to-Door collecting model, I used a database provided by the 
Associació de Municipis Catalans per a la Recollida Porta a Porta (APAP, 2021). In this, it is shown which 
municipalities have implemented the Door-to-Door system. This data is collected from 2000 on.   
 
Municipal Political Database. The election results of Catalan municipal elections are provided by the 
open database from the Generalitat de Catalunya (Gencat, 2021). Moreover, the data on local politicians such 
as gender, party, and political post is obtained from the Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS, 2021). 
Also, I identify the political parties committed to the environment by using the political dictionary (ICPS, 
2000). These mentioned sources are complemented with data from Ministerio del Interior (Ministerio del 
                                                          
20 Regions of Spain (Autonomous Communities) without landfill tax on the Municipal Solid Waste in 2019: Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, 




Interior, 2021). Notice that municipal elections in Catalonia are held every four years. Hence, there are 
included the municipal elections from 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015. Finally, these sources also provide 
the data for the political control variables used also in the analysis. 
 
Socio-demographic Database. I obtain data from the Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya (IDESCAT) for the 
socio-demographic control variables, at the municipality level. It is complemented with the open database 
from the Generalitat de Catalunya (Gencat, 2021).  
 
II) Variables and summary statistics 
 
The outcome of interest in this study is in terms of the recycling rate of municipal waste and the DtD 
collection model. For the first indicator, I use the variable 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒, which is the share of recycled 
municipal waste in the total municipal waste generated. For the DtD model, I construct a binary dummy 
variable, 𝐷𝑡𝐷, which equals to one when the municipality has implemented the DtD model and equals to 
zero otherwise. 
Regarding the variables of interest, one political factor subject of this study is female representation in 
Catalan municipal politics. To examine this, I create two new variables. First, the share of seats held by 
women in the municipal council, 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠. This is the ratio between the number of seats 
held by female politicians in the municipal council and the number of the total seats of the municipal council.  
Second, I build a binary dummy variable which equals one when the mayor is a woman and equals zero if 
the mayor is a man, 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟.  In Spain, the mayor of a municipal council is who has ultimate power 
in the local government, hence, it is expected to influence. However, as shown in Section 3, only around 
20% of mayors in Catalonia are women in 2019. Therefore, I also include into the study the share of seats 
held by women, which can also have potential influence, as members of the municipal council.  
On the other hand, I also examine the representation of “green” parties in local politics. In this sense, 
I build two more variables; one is the share of “green” seats in the municipal council, 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠. 
This is defined as the ratio between the number of seats of the municipal council held by politicians who 
belong to a “green” party and the number of the total seats of the municipal council. The other one is a 
binary dummy variable which equals to one when the mayor belongs to a “green” party and equals to zero 
otherwise, 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟. As before, I use these two variables to show the representation of the “green” 
local parties in the municipal council. Finally, I also aim to study the economic effect of the tax on landfill 
disposal, 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥,  which is the yearly amount established for the tax on landfill disposal for the Catalan 
Government, defined in terms of €/tonne. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of these main variables. Note Table A.1 in the Appendix shows 







Table 1: Summary statistics of the main variables 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DtD 0.091 0.287 0 1 
Recycling Rate 30.264 18.459 0 100 
Female Mayor 0.124 0.330 0 1 
Share of Female Seats 26.213 20.234 0 100 
Green Mayor 0.162 0.3692 0 1 
Share of Green Seats 21.816 24.772 0 100 
Landfill Tax 13.385 11.001 0 41.3 
 
 
Figure 4 shows two maps of Catalonia in 2019. On the first map (left) are illustrated, in black, the 
municipalities that have implemented the DtD model. There are 212 Catalan municipalities highlighted. The 
second map (right) shows the municipalities which have reached a 50% recycling rate in 2019. There are 
405 municipalities in black. From Figure 4 it can be seen that most of the municipalities that have already 
implemented the DtD model, by 2019, have reached the 50% recycling objective. This could suggest the 
effectiveness of the DtD collection model in terms of recycling rates. Nevertheless, this is still an initial 
suggestion. 
On the other hand, Figure 5 shows two graphs. On the left, the number of municipalities which adopted 
a selective waste collection, from 2000 to 2019. It also includes the year of the introduction of the landfill 
tax. The graph on the right shows two variables: the number of municipalities that implemented the DtD 
collection model and the evolution of the amount of the landfill tax, both variables comprise the period 
from 2000 to 2019.  From Figure 5 two features can be observed. Firstly, the adoption of selective waste 
collection has risen considerably in the last twenty years in Catalonia. The municipalities under and over 
5000 inhabitants seem to follow different patterns on the decision to implement selective waste collection. 
This fact would suggest population could play a role in the introduction of waste management policies at 
the local level (ARC, 2021). Secondly, I see that the evolution of the landfill tax and the evolution of 
municipalities with the DtD model follow a similar pattern. Hence, this tax could be determinant in the 
adoption of the DtD model.  However, these are only initial suggestions.  
One relevant comment here is regarding the data on the Catalan landfill tax. The data used in this study 
is provided from (ARC, 2021), which tells the amount established for the tax each year, in terms of €/t. 
Then, this amount is the same for all municipalities. Nevertheless, the design of this tax is the key feature 
of this instrument; it allows municipalities to pay more or less, through a reward or penalization, depending 
on several indicators such as the quality of the selective collection, the amount of recycling rate, or treatment 
of the waste after collection, among others. In other words, each municipality pays a different final amount 
depending on how good (or bad) its municipal waste management is, as regards the environmental impacts 
(ARC, 2017). However, there is no publicly available data on how much each municipality pays at the end 





Figure 4: Map of municipalities of Catalonia with the implemented Door-to-Door model in 2019 (left). Map of 










Notes: Map on the left: in black, municipalities of Catalonia which have adopted the DtD model by 2019. The map on the right: in black, municipalities of Catalonia 
that have reached the 50% recycling rate of municipal waste by 2019.  
Sources: Map on the left: Own elaboration replicating “Map of municipalities with implemented Door-to-Door system in Catalonia by February 2019”, based on data 
from (APAP, 2021). The map on the right: Own construction replicating figure based on a dataset from (ARC, 2021). 
 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of selective waste collection and DtD model. Relation with the landfill tax 
 
Notes: Left side graph: shows the number of municipalities that collect the organic waste separately, called the selective waste collection. This is regardless of the model on 
the selective waste collection implemented. The red line indicates the introduction of the landfill tax in 2004. The right side graph shows the evolution of the amount of 
landfill tax per year (black line) and the number of municipalities that adopted the DtD model (gray line).  
Source: Own elaboration based on data from (ARC, 2021). 
 
 
6 Empirical strategy 
 
This section describes the empirical methodology employed to study the political and economic factors 
that affect the adoption of the DtD collection model. Firstly, the baseline model is exposed. Secondly, I 
describe the Propensity Score Matching strategy and the final specifications, aiming for a causal-effect 
estimation.  
 
I)  Baseline Model.  
 
Fixed Effects specification: the Recycling Rate. I employ a Fixed Effects model in which the recycling 




𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝜃1𝐷𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛺𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑃′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛵𝑡 +  𝜐𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
where 𝑖 is a Catalan municipality in year 𝑡. The 𝐷𝑡𝐷 is the dummy variable telling on the adoption of the 
DtD collection model. Moreover, 𝑋′ is a set of socio-demographic control variables, and 𝑃′ is a set of 
political control variables. Municipality fixed effects, 𝜂, and time fixed effects, 𝛵, are included. Municipality 
fixed effects capture time-invariant municipality characteristics. Time fixed effects control for unit-specific 
effects due to time, then capture varies over time but is common to all municipalities. Note, I follow a 
sequential analysis from which I aim to analyze the main elements that explain the recycling rate across 
municipalities. Thus, I introduce each variable consecutively (see Table 2). 
The set of socio-demographic control variables, 𝑋′, includes variables on population, density, and area, 
for each municipality and year. Also, the age structure of the population, divided into three groups; from 0-
14 years old, from 15-64 years old, and from 65 years old on. Moreover, the level of education of the 
population, divided into five groups: Illiterates, No Education, Primary Education, Secondary Education, 
and High Education. And the share of foreigners. Finally, the number of municipal green associations per 
capita. On the other hand, a set of political control variables is also added, 𝑃′, controlling for the re-election 
of the mayor, the majority of the seats, and the political ideology of the municipal council, in terms of the 
share of left-wing seats. The coefficient of interest, 𝜃1, captures the relationship between the DtD model 
and the recycling rate of municipal waste. This is the subject of this analysis. 
 
Note the model (1) sets up the first part of the study. I examine which elements influence the recycling 
rate of municipal waste in Catalonia. I found the coefficient 𝜃1 is the highest, and its effect is positive and 
statistically significant (see section 7). In other words, the DtD model is the main determinant of the 
recycling rate of municipal waste, and then, the key variable to be studied from now on. Therefore, model 
(1) confirms that the implementation of the DtD collection model is the core policy of this study; so, my 
goal is to analyze the political and economic factors that determine the adoption of the DtD model.  
However, one empirical concern arises here. The DtD model is found as the key municipal policy. 
Nevertheless, this collection model is not vastly used among municipalities; in 2019 only 212 municipalities, 
out of 947, had adopted the DtD model. Intuitively, the adoption of this collection model is not random, 
neither in space nor regarding socio-demographic municipal determinants. Hence, leading to an empirical 
issue on the selection of observables into the DtD collection model.  
Considering the above, I employ a matching procedure to deal with the selection of observables, on 
my original sample, of municipalities with the DtD model and without the DtD model. The selection of the 
sample is performed by using the “propensity score” matching. Then, I am able to obtain a sample with 
nearly identical municipalities. And the only distinction among them being the adopted (or not) DtD model. 
The identification strategy of this study relies on the fact that, prior to matching, there are differences in 
socio-demographic characteristics among municipalities that have the DtD model and that do not adopt 




matching, this unbalance is corrected. Hence, with the selected sample through the matching procedure, I 
can compare nearly identical municipalities. By using the data from the final matched sample I proceed with 
the estimation, as suggested by (Ho et al., 2007), from which I am able to estimate the causal effect of the 
political and economic factors on the adoption of the DtD model. Below I expose the matching procedure 
and the followed estimation models.  
 
II)  Matching strategy 
 
To address the selection concern I proceed with the Propensity Score Matching, which selects the 
control municipalities based on the “propensity score” (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Ho et al., 2007; Stuart 
and Rubin, 2007) (see details below). As aforementioned, the identification strategy is based on the fact that, 
after the matching, I obtain from the original sample of 947 municipalities, a smaller sample with comparable 
municipalities, being this a balanced sample. In sum, I structured this methodology as a three steps 
procedure:   
 
 Step 1) I estimate a first Fixed Effects regression including only socio-demographic explanatory 
variables, in which the dependent variable is 𝐷𝑡𝐷. The explanatory variables are those social and 
demographic features that are expected to influence the adoption of the DtD model, according to the 
literature on recycling and management of waste. From this, I know which non-political characteristics 
influence the DtD model. 
 Step 2) I employ a Propensity Score Matching strategy where the control municipalities are selected 
through the “propensity score”. The binary dummy variable 𝐷𝑡𝐷 acts as a treatment.  The matching is based 
on the covariates, which are the socio-demographic explanatory variables from the previous step. After the 
matching procedure, I obtain a smaller and homogeneous matched sample, 𝑚, comprising nearly identical 
municipalities.  
 Step 3) I specify a Fixed Effects model by using the new sample 𝑚, and the 𝐷𝑡𝐷 as a dependent 
variable. From this, the coefficients of interest capture and estimate the causal effects of political and 
economic factors on the implementation of the DtD collection model.  
 
Step 1) Fixed Effects specification. Firstly, I estimate a model where the dependent variable is the 𝐷𝑡𝐷. 
As explanatory variables, I include the socio-demographic variables, 𝑋′. I base the inclusion of these 
variables on previous literature and the theory on waste management and recycling waste. Hence, I include 
the population, the density, and the area of each municipality for the urban context of each municipality 
(Puig-Ventosa et al., 2013; Romano et al., 2019; ARC, 2021). Also, I include the age structure of the 
population, which is found to be a determinant for environmental issues and recycling performance 




Ecoembes (2019)21 also report differences in attitudes and performances, between groups of ages, on 
recycling. In this study I structure the age population into three groups; from 0 to 14 years old, from 15 to 
64 years old, and from 65 years old on, based on the data groups from IDESCAT. Furthermore, it is also 
stated that the education of the population is a factor that can be related to waste collection and recycling 
performance (Ipsos, 2019). Then, I include the levels of education distributed in five groups; Illiterates, No 
education, Primary education, Secondary Education, and High Education. Related to education level, I also 
include the share of foreigners. Finally, the number of green associations per capita is included as social 
capital. Time fixed effects, 𝛵, and municipality fixed effects, 𝜂, are included.  
In this way, I identify the socio-demographic variables that are a common feature on the 
implementation of the DtD model. See Table A.2 in the Appendix.   
  
Step 2) Propensity Score Matching. I proceed with the called Propensity Score Matching, first introduced 
by (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The “propensity score” is the probability that one observation 𝑖 can be 
part of the Treatment, based on observed pre-treatment covariates (Ho et al., 2007).  In this study, the DtD 
model acts as a Treatment, and the pre-treatment covariates are the socio-demographic variables. Therefore, 
within this matching strategy, the propensity score is calculated and used to match observations based on 
its “similar” propensity score (Stuart and Rubin, 2007).  
I build a probabilistic model where the dependent variable is the binary dummy variable 𝐷𝑡𝐷, and the 
explanatory variables are the socio-demographic covariates, observed before the treatment.22 The Treatment 
is the 𝐷𝑡𝐷 observed in the year 2019 (end of the period). Contrary, 𝐶′ is the set of municipal covariates 
observed in the year 2000 (pre-treatment). Aiming for a good balance of covariates and a good quality of 
the matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Ho et al., 2007; Stuart and Rubin, 2008), the municipal 
covariates are only included in the final Probit model when they are statistically significant. In this sense, the 
municipal covariates introduced in the probabilistic model are 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦, % 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ, 
and %𝐴𝑔𝑒2 (15 − 64 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑). See Table A.3 in the Appendix.  
 
Following (Stuart and Rubin, 2008 and Ho et al., 2007) and considering the design of my study, I 
employ as a matching algorithm the ‘nearest neighbor matching’, which matches each treated observation 
to an untreated observation that has similar estimated propensity scores (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005; 
Stuart and Rubin, 2008). Moreover, I enable the variant ‘with replacement’ in which an untreated 
observation can be used more than once as a match. (Ho et al., 2007) By using so, I obtain a good quality 
of the matching while reducing the bias. I limit the matching for a single neighbor, which matches the closest 
control unit that has not yet been matched (Ho et al., 2007). Finally, I use a caliper of 0.05. I found this 
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caliper as the one which provides me a good balance of the match. Figure A.5 in the Appendix illustrates 
the distribution of the propensity score before and after matching. 
In the end, I obtain a matched sample, 𝑚, of 381 observations from which 212 are treated and 169 are 
untreated. The treated observations are all 212 municipalities that had implemented the DtD model in 2019, 
in my original panel. The 169 untreated observations are municipalities without the DtD model. The 381 
observations from the matching sample are nearly identical municipalities, only differing on the adoption of 
the DtD collection model. I check for the balance of the match by comparing, before and after the match, 
at several indicators; differences in means, the reduction bias, the pseudo R2, and the joint test (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005; Ho et al., 2007).  
Once I conclude the good quality of the match, I proceed with the analysis. Note in section 7 is 
discussed the matching procedure.   
   
Step 3) Fixed Effects specification after matching. I build the final panel using the matched sample, 
and I estimate the following model (2): 
𝐷𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾2𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗𝐶′𝑖𝑡 + 𝛺𝑋′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑃′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
where 𝑖 is a Catalan municipality from the matched sample in year 𝑡. The 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 refers to the 
variables on female representation and the “green” parties' representation in the municipal council. On the 
other hand, the 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥 is the economic factor derived from the Catalan tax on landfill disposal. 
Moreover, there are included socio-demographic and political control variables, 𝐶′, 𝑋′, 𝑃′. Time fixed effects, 
𝛵, and municipality fixed effects, 𝜂, are included. Time fixed effects control for unit-specific effects due to 
time, then capture varies over time but is common to all municipalities. Municipality fixed effects capture 
time-invariant municipality characteristics. Additionally, in the model (2) I use weights as suggested by (Ho 
et al., 2007). The use of weights considers how many observations each observation represents, thus, 
ensuring the actual observations after the matching (Ho et al., 2007). 
There are included as control variables; the socio-demographic covariates used in the Probit model for 
the construction of the match, 𝐶′, as the logarithm of the population, the density, the share of foreigners, 
and the group age (15-64 years old). Also, there are included the left socio-demographic control variables 
were discarded from the match, 𝑋′, as suggested by (Ho et al., 2007). The set of political control variables, 
𝑃′, includes controls for the majority of seats, the re-election of the mayor, and the ideology of the municipal 
council in terms of the share of left-wing seats.  
 
Coefficients of interest. From model (2), the coefficient 𝛾1 captures the causal effect between political 
factors, as female representation; 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟 and 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠, and the “green” parties’ 




hand, 𝛾2 captures the causal effect of the Catalan tax on landfill disposal, 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥, on the adoption of 




This section shows the main results from the study and presents a robustness analysis. I also discuss 
the matching procedure and the quality of the match.  
 
7.1 Main results 
 
 
I) Baseline Model. Results 
 
The results from the model (1) are shown in Table 2, from which I analyze the main determinants that 
influence the recycling rate of municipal waste. Table 2 presents three columns, all of them estimated with 
a Fixed Effects panel estimator. Column 1 includes the socio-demographic variables. Column 2 adds, into 
the previous variables, the political controls variables. And Column 3 also adds the dummy variable of the 
DtD collection model. 
Results from Table 2 clearly suggest the DtD collection model is the main determinant of the recycling 
rate, being its effect positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level). Moreover, the logarithm of the 
population and the density shows a negative and statistical significance effect (at 1% level) on the recycling 
rate, in all three models. These two demographic factors were expected to be negative, as also reported in 
previous studies (Puig-Ventosa et al., 2013; ARC, 2021). The share of foreigners and the levels of education 
show positive and statistically significant effects, in all three models. In this sense, there are not notorious 
differences among levels of education, even though the group with higher education is the one which seems 
to influence the most. Considering the age structure of the population, it is found the group between 15-64 
years old is the only one showing a statistical significance effect, being this negative. Finally, it can be 
observed the green associations’ per capita show a negative and statistically effect, which was not expected 
to have this negative sign.  
The main conclusion from Table 2 is that the DtD collection model is found as the key determinant of 
the recycling rate of municipal waste in Catalonia. Given the importance of the DtD model for the recycling 
rate, the 𝐷𝑡𝐷 becomes the outcome of interest from now on. Therefore, I continue the empirical analysis 
by employing the matching procedure. I aim to study the potential causal effect of political and economic 








Table 2: Determinants of the recycling rate: the role of socio-demographic and political characteristics 
 1 2 3 
Area 0.3629 0.3142 0.1398 
 (0.5932) (0.5942) (0.5358) 
Density -0.0088*** -0.0086*** -0.0064*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
Log Population  -4.2487*** -4.1518*** -3.0536*** 
 (0.8671) (0.8710) (0.7856) 
% Non-Spanish 0.1038** 0.1050** 0.0935** 
 (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0313) 
% No Education 0.3914** 0.4006** 0.4520*** 
 (0.1489) (0.1490) (0.1343) 
% Primary Education 0.3147* 0.3248* 0.3680** 
 (0.1470) (0.1471) (0.1327) 
% Secondary Education 0.3707* 0.3814** 0.4013** 
 (0.1451) (0.1452) (0.1309) 
% Higher Education 0.4186** 0.4264** 0.5061*** 
 (0.1473) (0.1474) (0.1329) 
% Age1 (0-14 years old) 0.0082 0.0005 -0.0087 
 (0.0734) (0.0735) (0.0663) 
% Age2 (15-64 years old) -0.2163*** -0.2285*** -0.2967*** 
 (0.0563) (0.0566) (0.0510) 
Green Associations -0.6108** -0.6126** -0.5068** 
 (0.2029) (0.2030) (0.1830) 
% Left Seats 0.0066 0.0110* 
  (0.0050) (0.0045) 
Mayor Re-election  -0.8375 -0.5830 
  (0.4884) (0.4404) 
Majority Seats 0.3019 0.3262 
  (0.2622) (0.2364) 
DtD  24.8739*** 
   (0.4447) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14580 14580 14580 
Notes: Variable dependent: Recycling Rate (%). Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels:  * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, and *** for p<.001. 
 
 
II) Propensity Score Matching 
 
Balance and quality of the match. As exposed in section 5, the matching strategy selects observations 
from my original sample, based on a treatment variable and pre-treatment covariates. Then, this 
methodology aims to correct the selection concern from my original sample.  
Within the matching framework, the 𝐷𝑡𝐷 acts as a treatment. Consequently, the matched sample is 
divided into two subgroups; the treatment and the control groups. Note, in the original sample there are 
212 municipalities with the DtD model and 735 municipalities without the DtD model. After the matching, 
I obtained a sample with 212 treated observations (with the DtD model) and 169 untreated observations 
(without the DtD model). Therefore, I check whether the matched sample is obtained with a good balance 
and good quality of the match based on (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Ho et al., 2007; Stuart and Rubin, 
2007). Table A.3 in the Appendix shows the probabilistic model used for the matching and the estimated 
coefficients. The explanatory variables are only included in this Probit model if they are statistically 
significant (Caliendo and Kopeining, 2005; Ho et al, 2007). Remember these variables come from Step 1), 
where I analyze the non-political factors that determine the DtD model (see section 6). Table A.4 in the 




control group, the mean of the variables included in the match; the best the smallest the differences in 
means (Ho et al., 2007). Additionally, I look at the reduction bias of the variables included (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1985). In my case, these are: 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  92.7%, 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 73.4%, %𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ 94.9% and 
%𝐴𝑔𝑒2 (15 − 64 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑) 92.3%. On the other hand, I also check the t-Test between the treated and 
untreated groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Caliendo and Kopeining, 2005). These, after matching, are 
expected to be not significant. In my case, the p-values for the t-Test are: 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  0.924, 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 
0.571, %𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠ℎ 0.840 and %𝐴𝑔𝑒2 (15 − 64 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑙𝑑) 0.894. Finally, I check the joint significance 
and the pseudo R2 (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Caliendo and Kopeining, 2005). The joint significance 
test should be rejected after the matching, and not before the matching; p-values of the LR test are 0.000 
before matching and 0.976 after the matching. Regarding the pseudo R2, after matching this should be low, 
since no differences in the distribution of variables among the two groups are expected (Caliendo and 
Kopeining, 2005), in my case, this is 0.001.  
Figure A.5 in the Appendix shows the distribution of the propensity score, before and after the 
matching. Notice, I obtained a sample of 381 remaining observations after the matching. Considering all 
the above I conclude for the good balance and quality of the matching procedure. 
 
Estimation after matching.  After the matching procedure, I proceed to estimate the Fixed Effects model 
(2), using the matched sample, 𝑚. Note, I do not use the propensity score procedure as a methodology of 
estimating a causal effect, through the treatment effect. Rather, I use the matching strategy for the selection 
of the sample previous to the estimation of the final model, as recommended by (Ho et al., 2007). The goal 
of the matching strategy is to obtain a balanced sample, with nearly identical municipalities. Therefore, I 
continue with the analysis by the Fixed Effects estimator, in which the final estimations also use weights, as 
required by (Ho et al., 2007). From this, I am able to capture the causal effect estimation.  
 
 
III)  Main results 
 
In this subsection are shown the results of the causal effect estimation of the political factors, female 
representation and “green” parties’ representation, and of the economic factor, the landfill tax, on the DtD 
collection model.  
 
Female representation in the municipal councils: Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 report the results of the 
presence of female politicians’ effect on the DtD model. All columns are Fixed Effects models, using the 
matched sample and weights. Firstly, in Table 3.1 it is shown the effect of female mayors on the adoption 
of the DtD model. This effect is negative and statistically significant, only, in Columns 1, 2, and 3. However, 
when finally including all socio-demographic controls into the model, Column 4, there is no statistically 
significant effect of female mayors on the adoption of the Dtd model. Secondly, Table 3.2 adds the impact 




line, when controlling for political and socio-demographic variables, it is not found an influence of the share 
of female seats on the adoption of the DtD collection model. Neither of the interactions between the two 
variables on the DtD model. Notice I study the presence of female mayors, the share of female seats, and 
the interaction of both in a consecutive way. 
Overall, results from Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 show no empirical evidence of the effect of female 
representation in the municipal council on the DtD model. Hence, the political factor of the gender of the 
politician does not show a statistically significant influence on the adoption of the DtD model. 
 
 
Table 3.1: Effect of Female Mayor on the implementation of the Door-to-Door collection model 
 1 2 3 4 
Female Mayor -0.0327** -0.0260* -0.0233* -0.0110 
 (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0125) 
Demographic controls (not included in the matching) No No No Yes 
Demographic controls (included in the matching) No No Yes Yes 
Political controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treated 212 212 212 212 
Control  169 169 169 169 
Observations 6696 6696 6696 6696 
Notes: Variable dependent: Door-to-Door dummy variable. The estimations use weights. “Treated” refers to the observations from the treatment group of the matched sample. “Control” 
refers to the observations from the control group of the matched sample. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels:  * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, and *** for p<.001. 
 
 
Table 3.2:  Effect of Female Mayor and Female Seats on  the implementation of the Door-to-Door collection 
model 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Female Mayor -0.0360*** -0.0297** -0.0270* -0.0132 -0.0153 -0.0188 -0.0172 -0.0152 
 (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0110) (0.0126) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0299) 
Share of Female Seats 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Female Mayor × 
Share of Female Seats 
    -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001 
     (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
Demographic 
controls (not 
included in the 
matching) 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Demographic 
controls (included in 
the matching) 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Political controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treated 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 
Control  169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 
Observations 6696 6696 6696 6696 6696 6696 6696 6696 
Notes: Variable dependent: Door-to-Door dummy variable. The estimations use weights. “Treated” refers to the observations from the treatment group of the matched sample. 
“Control” refers to the observations from the control group of the matched sample. Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels:  * for p<.05, ** for p<.01, and *** for p<.001. 
 
 
“Green” political parties: Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 present the results for the political effect of the “green” 
parties in the municipal council on the DtD collection model. All columns are Fixed Effects models, using 
the matched sample and weights. Firstly, Table 4.1 shows the results on the effect of “green” mayors on the 




Table 4.2 adds the effect of the share of “green” seats and the interaction between the two variables on the 
DtD model. Results from Table 4.2 does not show a statistically significant influence on the adoption of 
the DtD model when adding all political and socio-demographic control variables. Moreover, the interaction 
of “green” variables does not show a statistical effect either. I study the effect of these variables 
consecutively. 
In sum, Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 do not show empirical evidence of the political influence from the 
“green” political parties on the DtD collection model. Altogether, the above results indicate that no political 
factors appear to affect the adoption of the DtD collection model. Neither the presence of women in politics 
nor the influence of “green” political parties. 
 
 
Table 4.1:  Effect of Green Mayor on  the implementation of the Door-to-Door collection model 
 1 2 3 4 
Green Mayor -0.0131 -0.0055 -0.0041 0.0002 
 (0.0088) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0102) 
Demographic controls (not included in the matching) No No No Yes 
Demographic controls (included in the matching) No No Yes Yes 
Political controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treated 212 212 212 212 
Control  169 169 169 169 
Observations 6696 6696 6696 6696 
Notes: Variable dependent: Door-to-Door dummy variable. The estimations use weights. “Treated” refers to the observations from the treatment group of the matched sample. “Control” 




Table 4.2:  Effect of Green Mayor and Green Seats on the implementation of the Door-to-Door collection model 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Green Mayor -0.0109 -0.0168 -0.0157 -0.0059 0.0308 0.0095 0.0100 0.0102 
 (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0110) (0.0196) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0227) 
Share of Green Seats -0.0001 0.0007** 0.0008** 0.0004 0.0002 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0005 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Green Mayor × Share 
of Green Seats 
- - - - -0.0009* -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0004 
     (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Demographic 
controls (not 
included in the 
matching) 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Demographic 
controls (included in 
the matching) 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Political controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treated 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 
Control  169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 
Observations 6696 6696 6696 6696 6696 6696 6696 6696 
Notes: Variable dependent: Door-to-Door dummy variable. The estimations use weights. “Treated” refers to the observations from the treatment group of the matched sample. “Control” 







Landfill tax: I continue by studying the effect of the economic factor on the DtD collection model. Table 
5 reports the results of the landfill tax’s effect on the DtD model.  All five columns are Fixed Effects models, 
using the matched sample and weights. From Table 5 it is observed this economic instrument has a positive 
and statistically significant effect (at 1% level) on the DtD collection model. This result is statistically 
significant also when including all socio-demographic and political controls variables, Column 5. This 
coefficient estimates the causal effect of the landfill tax on the DtD collection model, and it is estimated 
that one unit more of the Landfill Tax (€/t) increases the probability to adopt the DtD collection model in 
1.37 percentage points.   
Therefore, in accordance with the main results the economic motive, as the landfill tax, is the only 
factor found that influences the adoption of the DtD collection model. Conversely, no political factors are 
behind the DtD model.  
 
Table 5: Effect of Landfill tax on the implementation of the Door-to-Door collection model 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Landfill Tax 0.011855*** 0.012071*** 0.010796*** 0.009445*** 0.013727*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0010) 
Demographic controls (not 
included in the matching) No No No Yes            Yes 
Demographic controls (included 
in the matching) No No Yes Yes Yes 
Political controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Term of Office time Effects No No No No Yes 
Treated 212 212 212 212 212 
Control  169 169 169 169 169 
Observations 6696 6696 6696 6696 6696 
Notes: Variable dependent: Door-to-Door dummy variable. The estimations use weights. “Treated” refers to the observations from the treatment group of the matched sample. “Control” 




7.2 Robustness analysis 
 
This study attempts to analyze the effect of two political factors and one economic factor on the 
adoption of the DtD collection model. Conversely, the robustness check analyses the main results in a 
different sense. I consider the possibility that political and economic factors could influence the DtD model 
at the same time. Hence, I check whether both political factors, such as female representation and the 
“green” parties’ representation, together with the economic factor, the landfill tax, affect the DtD model in 
the same way as the main results whereas they are considered at the same time. 
I construct Table 6, where the three columns. Column 1 shows the results considering only the effect 
of female representation in local politics. Column 2 adds to the previous variables the effects of the presence 
of “green” political parties. Hence, Column 2 shows the effect of all political factors considered in the 
analysis, together. Finally, Column 3 includes the effect of the landfill tax on the above effects.  
From Table 6 it is observed the results from the robustness analysis are in the same line as the main 
results of this study. Firstly, there is no statistically significant effect of the presence of women in politics 




no political factors seem to affect the DtD model. Contrary, there is a positive and statistically significant 
effect (at 1% level) of the economic factor on the DtD model, this coefficient estimates the causal effect of 
the landfill tax on the adoption of the DtD model. Also, when considering all political factors. Therefore, 
the landfill tax is the only factor that proves empirical evidence of a positive effect on the adoption of the 
DtD model. Hence, I verify that when considering all political and economic factors at the same time, the 
main results remain.  
 
 
Table 6: Robustness analysis 
 1 2 3 
Female Mayor -0.015186 -0.007976 -0.007976 
 (0.0299) (0.0303) (0.0303) 
Share of Female Seats 0.000316 0.000340 0.000340 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Female Mayor ×  Share of Female Seats 0.000054 -0.000214 -0.000214 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Green Mayor  0.009627 0.009627 
  (0.0228) (0.0228) 
Share of Green Seats 0.000503 0.000503 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Green Mayor × Share of Green Seats -0.000365 -0.000365 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Landfill Tax   0.013805*** 
   (0.0011) 
Demographic controls (not included in the matching) Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic controls (included in the matching) Yes Yes Yes 
Political controls Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Treated 212 212 212 
Control  169 169 169 
Observations 6696 6696 6696 
Notes: Variable dependent: Door-to-Door dummy variable. The estimations use weights. “Treated” refers to the observations from the treatment group of the matched sample. 







Climate change is one of the biggest challenges the world faces nowadays. The multilateral political 
agreements, taking place at the international stage, emphasize the local action for this global problem, 
considering the waste management sector as very strategic. This study understands the relevance of local 
politicians in the fight against climate change; I aim to analyze the political and economic factors that 
influence the adoption of the DtD collection model. The management of municipal waste and selective 
waste collection has become essential political decisions to achieve high rates of recycled waste.  
The main results of this study do not find empirical evidence that female representation affects the 
adoption of the DtD model. Moreover, I do not find that “green” political parties influence, either, the 
adoption of the DtD model. In sum, no political factors show statistically significant effects on the DtD 




municipalities. On the other hand, the main results find a positive influence of the landfill tax on the DtD 
model. This is a causal effect between the landfill tax and the adoption of the DtD, estimated as the one 
unit more of the landfill tax (€/t) increases the probability to adopt the DtD collection model by 1.37 
percentage points. Therefore, the economic motive is the only factor that influences the adoption of the 
DtD model.  
In the same direction as me, some economic literature reported no evidence of the role of female 
politicians on political outcomes (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014; Bagues and Campa, 2018; Carozzi and Gago, 
2021). However, in this study, it is found that no political factors are influencing the decision on the DtD 
model, neither form the representation of “green” parties. The economic factor is found to be the only 
motive behind the adoption of the DtD model, in the same line as reported in studies by ENT (2012) and 
APAP (2021).  
 
The findings of this study have several policy implications. Firstly, it shows the landfill tax is an effective 
instrument to redirect the environmental policies to a more green and sustainable horizon, following the 
direction of the international agreements on climate action. Therefore, this economic instrument is found 
as efficient in its goal to increase the recycling rate of municipal waste, while incentivizing local politicians 
to commit to stricter environmental policies, such as the adoption of the DtD collection model. And so, to 
achieve high rates of recycling waste, promote selective waste collection, and reduce waste generation.  
On the other hand, no political influence behind the DtD model. Neither from female representation 
in local politics nor the “green” local parties. This fact could be explained by the specific design of this 
collection model. The DtD model directly implies an important change of habits for the citizens that are 
subject to, influencing their daily routines on recycling domestic waste and waste collection. Then, it seems 
to be a challenge to adopt the DtD collection model when citizens disagree with such direct influence on 
them. In other words, local politicians have to decide to adopt this brave environmental policy despite the 
discontentment of some citizens. They need to be convinced with the adoption of the DtD model, 
regardless of the citizen’s opinion or even regarding the further electoral results. Altogether, these features 
draw the complex context of the adoption of the DtD model at the municipal level, and help us to 
understand why this model is not vastly used across Catalonia, among other factors.  
 
Finally, two remaining facts behind this master thesis, in my view, are relevant to mention. On the one 
hand, the limited commitment of political parties to environmental protection. It seems to be a pending 
subject that urgently needs to be considered given the current climate emergency.  And, on the other hand, 
the vast under-representation of women in local politics, particularly when becoming a mayor. In twenty 
years, from 2000 to 2020, it achieved the share of 23% of female mayors in Catalan municipalities. This is 
far from full gender parity, and illustrates the huge structural problem societies face with women in public 
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Table A.1: Summary statistics control  variables 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Area 33.92847 34.92593 0.4 302.82 
Density 427.4269 1554.982 0.7 21724.4 
Log Population 7.066979 1.687539 2.944439 14.30823 
% Non-Spanish 8.154029 6.754636 0 52.2489 
% No Education 9.619275 6.4555 0 58.33333 
% Illiterates 1.276297 1.23895 0 9.78399 
% Primary Education 27.01289 12.02213 0 85.29412 
% Secondary Education 35.1762 9.335471 4.104478 74.81752 
% Higher Education 26.91534 9.743142 1.845018 69.98301 
% Age1 (0-14 years old) 13.47795 3.870594 0 24.95238 
% Age2 (15-64 years old) 65.36302 4.561591 39.21569 92.59259 
% Age3 (>65 years old) 21.15902 6.732075 5.263158 58.53658 
Green Associations 1.01894 2.625983 0 35.71429 
% Left Seats 41.2762 29.51918 0 100 
Majority Seats 0.7265427 0.4457453 0 1 
Mayor Re-election 0.0758184 0.2678867 0 1 
 
 
Table A.2: Determinants of the DtD model: Socio-demographic characteristics 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Log Population -0.042407*** -0.042444*** -0.034937** -0.042011*** -0.041933*** -0.040431** -0.043319** 
 (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0127) (0.0149) (0.0151) 
Area  0.010977 0.008020 0.008908 0.008753 0.007934 0.007970 
  (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
Density   -0.000074*** -0.000080*** -0.000072*** -0.000083*** -0.000084*** 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
% Non-Spanish    0.002386*** 0.002093*** 0.000549 0.000538 
    (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
% Age1(0-14 
years old) 
    0.000883 0.000281 0.000276 
     (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
% Age2 (15-64 
years old) 
    0.001961** 0.002571** 0.002586** 
     (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
% Age3 (>65 
years old) 
    0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
     (.) (.) (.) 
% No education      0.001127 0.001123 
      (0.0008) (0.0008) 
% Illiterates      0.003102 0.003086 
      (0.0026) (0.0026) 
% Primary 
Education 
     0.001464* 0.001466* 
      (0.0007) (0.0007) 
% Secondary 
Education 
     0.002408*** 0.002406*** 
      (0.0007) (0.0007) 
% Higher 
Education 
     0.000000 0.000000 
      (.) (.) 
Green 
Associations 
      -0.004029 
Time Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14580 14580 14580 14580 14580 14580 14580 





Table A.3: Probabilistic Model 
Door to Door  Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Log Population .1739914 .0398733 4.36 0.000 .0958412 .2521416 
Density -.0001417 .0000493 -2.87 0.004 -.0002384 -.000045 
Non Spanish  -.0797498 .020738 -3.85 0.000 -.1203955 -.0391042 
% Age (15-64) -.0302609 .0102647 -2.95 0.003 -.0503794 -.0101424 
Cons .2575736 .6072592 0.42 0.671 -.9326324 144.778 
Notes:  Estimation: Probabilistic regression. Variable dependent: Door-to-Door model. Standard errors in parenthesis.  
 
 







Matched Treated Control t 𝑝 >  |𝑡|  
Log Population 
U 7.0307 6.8438 12.3 
92.7 
1.48 0.139 
M 7.0307 7.0445 -0.9 -0.10 0.924 
Density 
U 292.21 503.93 -14.3 
73.4 
-1.68 0.094 
M 292.21 348.58 -3.8 -0.57 0.571 
% Non-Spanish 
U 2.0632 2.8547 -30.4 
94.9 
-3.63 0.000 
M 2.0632 2.0229 1.5 0.20 0.840 
% Age2 (15-64 years old) 
U 64.67 65.54 -17.3 
92.3 
-2.14 0.033 
M 64.67 64.603 1.3 0.13 0.894 
Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 𝑝 >  𝑐ℎ𝑖2 
Unmatched 0.040 40.02 0.000 




Figure A.5: Distribution of Propensity scores 
 
 
 
 
 
